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Abstract The question of how to measure and classify people’s risk preferences is
of substantial importance in the field of economics. Inspired by the multitude of ways
used to elicit risk preferences, we conduct a holistic investigation of the most preva-
lent method, the multiple price list (MPL) and its derivations. In our experiment,
we find that revealed preferences differ under various versions of MPLs as well as
yield unstable results within a 30-minute time frame. We determine the most sta-
ble elicitation method with the highest forecast accuracy by using multiple measures
of within-method consistency and by using behavior in two economically relevant
games as benchmarks. A derivation of the well-known method by Holt and Laury
(American Economic Review 92(5):1644–1655, 2002), where the highest payoff is
varied instead of probabilities, emerges as the best MPL method in both dimensions.
As we pinpoint each MPL characteristic’s effect on the revealed preference and its
consistency, our results have implications for preference elicitation procedures in
general.
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1 Introduction
Risk is a fundamental concept that affects human behavior and decisions in many
real-life situations. Whether a person wants to invest in the stock market, tries to
select the best health insurance or just wants to cross the street, he/she will face risky
decisions every day. Therefore, risk attitudes are of high importance for decisions
in many economics-related contexts. A multitude of studies elicit risk preferences
in order to control for risk attitudes, as it is clear that they might play a relevant
role in explaining results — e.g. De Ve´ricourt et al. (2013) in the newsvendor set-
ting, Murnighan et al. (1988) in bargaining, Beck (1994) in redistribution or Tanaka
et al. (2010) in linking experimental data to household income, to name just a few.
Moreover, several papers try to shed light on the causes of risk-seeking and risk-
averse behavior in the general population with laboratory (Harrison and Rutstro¨m
2008), internet (Von Gaudecker et al. 2011) and field experiments (Andersson et al.
2016; Harrison et al. 2007). Since the seminal papers by Holt and Laury (2002,
2005), approximately 20 methods have been published which provide alternatives
to elicit risk preferences. They differ from each other in terms of the varied param-
eters, representation and framing. Many of these risk elicitation methods have the
same theoretical foundation and therefore claim to measure the same parameter
— a subject’s “true” risk preference. However, there are significant differences in
results depending on the method used, as an increasing amount of evidence suggests.
It follows that if someone’s revealed preference is dependent on the measurement
method used, scientific results and real-world conclusions might be biased and
misleading.
As far as existing comparison studies are concerned, they usually compare two
methods with each other and often use different stakes, parameters, framing, repre-
sentation, etc., which makes their results hardly comparable. Our paper complements
existing experimental literature by making the following contribution: Taking the
method by Holt and Laury (2002) as a basis, we conduct a comprehensive compari-
son of the multiple price list (MPL) versions of risk elicitation methods by classifying
all methods into nine categories. To the best of our knowledge, no investigation —
including various measures of between- and within-method consistency — has ever
been conducted in the literature that incorporates such a high number of methods. To
isolate the effect of different methods, we consistently use the MPL representation
and calibrate the risk intervals to be the same for each method assuming expected util-
ity theory (EUT) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), while also keeping the
risk-neutral expected payoff of each method constant and employing a within-subject
design. Moreover, our design allows us to investigate whether differences across
methods can be reconciled by assuming different functional forms documented in
the literature such as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), decreasing relative
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risk aversion (DRRA), decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increasing rela-
tive risk aversion (IRRA) and increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). Additionally,
we extend our analysis to incorporate EUT with probability weighting and also to
incorporate prospect theory (PT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
We investigate the within-method consistency of each method by comparing the
differences in subjects’ initial and repeated decisions within the same MPL method.
Moreover, we assess methods’ self-perceived complexity and shed light on differ-
ences and similarities between methods. In the end, we provide suggestions for which
specific MPL representation to use by comparing our results to decisions in two
benchmark games that resemble real-life settings: investments in capital markets and
auctions. Therefore, we analyze the methods along two dimensions, robustness and
predictive power, and determine which properties of particular methods drive risk
attitude and its consistency.
We find that a particular modification of the method by Holt and Laury (2002)
derived by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012, 2016) has the highest predictive power in
investment settings both according to the OLS regression and Spearman rank correla-
tion. In addition, specific methods devised by Bruner (2009) also perform relatively
well in these analyses. However, the method by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012, 2016)
clearly outperforms the other methods in terms of within-method consistency and is
perceived as relatively simple — in the end, our study provides the recommenda-
tion for researchers to implement this method when measuring risk attitudes using
an MPL framework. Moreover, our results remain qualitatively the same if we relax
our assumption on the risk aversion function, or if we take probability weighting
or alternative theories such as prospect theory or cumulative prospect theory into
account.
1.1 Multiple price lists explained
Incentivized risk preference elicitation methods aim to quantify subjects’ risk per-
ceptions based on their revealed preferences. We present nine methods in a unified
structure — the commonly used MPL format — to our subjects, taking one of the
most cited methods as a basis: Holt and Laury (2002). The MPL table structure is
as follows: Each table has multiple rows, and in each row all subjects face a lottery
(two columns) on one side of the table, and a lottery or a certain payoff (one or two
columns) on the other side, depending on the particular method. Then, from row to
row, one or more of the parameters change. The methods differ from each other by
the parameter which is changing. As the options on the right side become strictly
more attractive from row to row, a subject indicates the row where he/she wants to
switch from the left option to the right option. This switching point then gives us
an interval for a subject’s risk preference parameter according to Table 1,1 assuming
EUT and CRRA2.
1To ease comparison to existing studies, we used exactly the same coefficient intervals as Holt and Laury
(2002).
2u(c) = c1−ρ1−ρ
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Table 1 Risk parameter
intervals (Holt/Laury) Interpretation Switching Risk parameter
by Holt and Laury (2002) Point Interval
Highly risk loving 1 ρ ≤ −0.95
Very risk loving 2 −0.95< ρ ≤ −0.49
Risk loving 3 −0.49< ρ ≤ −0.15
Risk neutral 4 −0.15< ρ ≤0.15
Slightly risk averse 5 0.15< ρ ≤0.41
Risk averse 6 0.41< ρ ≤0.68
Very risk averse 7 0.68< ρ ≤0.97
Highly risk averse 8 0.97< ρ ≤1.37
Stay in bed Never ρ >1.37
Notes: This table indicates the
mapping from a subject’s chosen
switching point into the resulting
risk parameter intervals in each
method; the leftmost column
contains the interpretation of the
risk intervals; “Never” means a
subject prefers the option “Left”
in each row
Note that several other representations of risk elicitation methods exist besides
the MPL such as the bisection method (Andersen et al. 2006), the trade-off method
(Wakker and Deneffe 1996), questionnaire-based methods (Weber et al. 2002),
willingness-to-pay (Hey et al. 2009), etc., but the MPL is favored because of its com-
mon usage. Andersen et al. (2006) consider that the main advantage of the MPL
format is that it is transparent to subjects and it provides simple incentives for truth-
ful preference revelation. They additionally list its simplicity and the little time it
takes as further benefits. As far as the specific risk elicitation method in the MPL
framework designed by Holt and Laury (2002) is concerned, it has proven itself
numerous times in providing explanations for several phenomena such as behavior
in 2x2 games (Goeree et al. 2003), market settings (Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007),
smoking, heavy drinking, being overweight or obese (Anderson and Mellor 2008),
consumption practices (Lusk and Coble 2005) and many others.
Early studies document violations of EUT under risky decision making and pro-
vide suggestions how these differences can be reconciled (Bleichrodt et al. 2001). In
addition, recent studies (Tanaka et al. 2010; Bocqueho et al. 2014) document poten-
tial empirical support for prospect theory (PT, Kahneman and Tversky (1979))3 when
it comes to risk attitudes: Harrison et al. (2010) found that PT describes behavior of
half of their sample best. There is also evidence that subjective probability weighting
(PW) (Quiggin 1982) should be taken into account. In addition, cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) — PT combined with PW (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) — might
also be a candidate that can explain the documented anomalies under EUT. Wakker
(2010) provides an extensive review on risk under PT.
We justify using CRRA asWakker (2008) claims that it is the most commonly pos-
tulated assumption among economists. Most recently, Chiappori and Paiella (2011)
3u(c) =
{
cα if c ≥ 0
−λ(−c)β if c < 0
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provide evidence on the validity of this assumption in economic-financial decisions.4
Nevertheless, alternative functional forms have been introduced, e.g. CARA5 (Pratt
1964). It was also questioned whether social status — and mostly the role of wealth
or income — might shape risk attitude, which would lead to functions which are
increasing or decreasing in these factors such as IRRA and DRRA (Andersen et al.
2012)6 or IARA and DARA (Saha 1993).7 A review of these functions is provided
by Levy (1994). In our robustness analysis, we relax our original assumptions on
EUT and CRRA and incorporate all of the above mentioned alternative theories and
functional forms. Note that even though we calibrated our parameters to accomo-
date EUT and CRRA, one is still able to calculate the risk parameter ρ using the
aforementioned alternative specifications.8
We group our aforementioned nine risk elicitation methods into two categories:
1. The standard gamble methods (SGmethods), where on one side of the table there
is always a 100% chance of getting a particular certain payoff and on the other
side there is a lottery.
2. The paired gamble methods (PG methods), with lotteries on both sides.
We therefore primarily conduct a comparison of different MPL risk elicitation
methods. What we do not claim, however, is that the method devised by Holt and
Laury (2002) (or MPL in general) is the most fitting to measure people’s risk pref-
erences — we strive to give a recommendation to researchers who already intend to
use Holt and Laury (2002) in their studies, and provide a better alternative that shares
its attributes with the original MPL design.
It should be mentioned that there is an alternative interpretation of our study: The
different MPLmethods can also be conceived as a mapping of existing risk elicitation
methods (from other frameworks) to the MPL space. Several methods exist where
the risk elicitation task is provided in a framed context — such as pumping a balloon
until it blows (Lejuez et al. 2002) or avoiding a bomb explosion (Crosetto and Filippin
2013). Similarly, some methods differ due to the representation of probabilities with
percentages (Holt and Laury 2002) or charts (Andreoni and Harbaugh 2010). All
these methods can be displayed with different MPLs by showing the probabilities and
the corresponding payoffs in a table format. We provide a complete classification of
these methods in the Literature Review section.
Up to now, different risk elicitation methods were compared by keeping the
original designs, but this approach comes at a price: As the methods differ in
many dimensions, any differences found can be attributed to any of those particular
4Note that this approach is also popular among economists due to its computational ease: The vast majority
of economic experiments assumes CRRA as well, which makes our results comparable to theirs.
5u(c) = −eρc
ρ
6u(c,W) = [(ωWr + cr )(1−ρ)/r ]/(1 − ρ)
7u(c,W) = −e−ρr(c+Wω)
ρ
8This implies that the same switching point in two methods does not yield the same risk parameter estimate
under different specifications, but these estimates are still directly comparable according to theory, as they
claim to measure a subject’s underlying risk attitudes ceteris paribus.
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Table 2 Method overview
What is changing?
Method Probability Highest payoff Lowest payoff Sure payoff
SGp yes no no no
SGhigh no yes no no
SGlow no no yes no
SGsure no no no yes
SGall no yes yes yes
PGp yes no no NA
PGhigh no yes no NA
PGlow no no yes NA
PGall yes yes yes NA
Notes: This table indicates
which parameters change from
row to row in each method,
where SG stands for “standard
gamble” and PG stands for
“paired gamble.”
characteristics. Our approach can be understood as a way to make all risk elicitation
methods as similar as possible, with the drawback of losing the direct connection
to the original representation. This paper should therefore primarily be seen as a
comparison of different MPL risk elicitation methods, and the resulting comparison
of existing risk elicitation methods by mapping them into the same space is only
reported for the sake of completeness.
1.2 Literature review
We will now discuss the different methods in greater detail and how they are embed-
ded in the literature, if at all. Table 2 provides a summary of the exact parameter that
is changing across methods.9
1.2.1 Standard gamble methods
Among the SG methods, there are four parameters that can be changed: The sure
payoff (sure), the high payoff of the lottery (high), the low payoff of the lottery
(low) or the probability of getting the high payoff (p) (or the probability of getting
the low payoff (1 − p), respectively). The parameters must of course be chosen in
such a way that high > sure > low always holds. For instance, we denote the
SG method where the low payoff is changing by “SGlow”, the SG method with the
varying certainty equivalent by “SGsure” or the standard gamble method where the
probabilities are changing as “SGp”.
Binswanger (1980) introduced a method (SGall) where only one of the options has
a certainty equivalent. The other options consist of lotteries where the probabilities
are fixed at 50-50, but both the high and the low payoff are changing. Cohen et al.
(1987) used risk elicitation tasks in which probabilities and lottery outcomes were
9For a complete list of all methods with the corresponding parameter values (as presented to subjects),
refer to the Online Resource.
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held constant and only the certainty equivalent was varied. These methods have later
been redesigned and presented in a more sophisticated format as a single choice task
by Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008).
A recent investigation by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) presents a similar method
(SGsure method) in an MPL format with 50-50 probabilities. Bruner (2009) presents
a particular certainty equivalent method, where the certainty equivalent and the lot-
tery outcomes are held constant, but the corresponding probabilities of the lotteries
are changing (SGp method). Additionally, Bruner (2009) introduces another method
where only the potential high outcomes of lotteries vary (SGhigh method). Although
not present in the literature, we chose to include a method where the potential low
outcome varies for reasons of completeness (SGlow method).10
1.2.2 Paired-gamble methods
Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) introduced the most-cited elicitation method under EUT
up to now, where potential outcomes are held constant and the respective probabilities
change (PGp). Drichoutis and Lusk (2012, 2016) suggest a similar framework where
the outcomes of different lotteries change while the probabilities are held constant.
We differentiate these methods further into PGhigh and PGlow depending on whether
the high or the low outcome is varied in the MPL. Additionally, the PGall method
varies both the probabilities and the potential earnings at the same time.
Many risk elicitation tasks used in the literature fit into the framework of choosing
between different lotteries. Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) provide ten dis-
crete options with different probabilities and outcomes to choose from. Lejuez et al.
(2002) introduce the Balloon Analogue Risk Task where subjects could pump up a
balloon, and their earnings depend on the final size of the balloon. The larger the
balloon gets, the more likely it will explode, in which case the subject earns noth-
ing. Visschers et al. (2009) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2010) use a pie chart for
probabilities and a slider for outcomes to visualize a similar trade-off effect in their
experiment. Crosetto and Filippin (2013) present their Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
with an interesting framing which quantifies the aforementioned trade-off between
probability and potential earnings with the help of a bomb explosion.11
1.2.3 Questionnaire methods
In addition to the MPL methods, we chose to also incorporate questionnaire risk elic-
itation methods into our study. Several methods have been introduced that evaluate
risk preferences with non-incentivized survey-based methods, and the questions and
the methodology they use are very similar. The most recently published ones include
the question from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (Dohmen et al. 2011) or
the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) by Blais and Weber (2006). For
a more detailed description, see the last paragraph of Section 2.
10For examples, see Tables 13 − 17 in the Online Resource, which correspond to the SG methods.
11For examples, see Tables 18 − 21 in the Online Resource, which correspond to the PG methods.
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1.2.4 Comparison studies
The question arises of which method to use if there is such a large variety of risk
elicitation methods and whether they lead to the same results. Comparison studies
exist, but the majority compare two methods with each other, and thus their scope
is limited. The question of within-method consistency has been addressed by some
papers: Harrison et al. (2005) document high re-test stability of the method intro-
duced by Holt and Laury (2002, PGp). Andersen et al. (2008b) test consistency of
the PGp (2002) method within a 17-month time frame. They find some variation
in risk attitudes over time, but do not detect a general tendency for risk attitudes to
increase or decrease. This result was confirmed in Andersen et al. (2008a). Yet there
is a gap in the academic literature on the time stability of different methods and their
representation that we are eager to fill.
Interestingly, more work has been done on the field of between-method consis-
tency. Fausti and Gillespie (2000) compare risk preference elicitation methods with
hypothetical questions using results from a mail survey. Isaac and James (2000)
conclude that risk attitudes and relative ranking of subjects is different in the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak procedure and in the first-price sealed-bid auction setting. Berg
et al. (2005) confirm that assessment of risk preferences varies generally across insti-
tutions in auction settings. In another comparison study, Bruner (2009) shows that
changing the probabilities versus varying the payoffs leads to different levels of risk
aversion in the PG tasks. Moreover, Dave et al. (2010) conclude that subjects show
different degrees of risk aversion in the Holt and Laury (2002, PGp) and in the Eckel
and Grossman (2008, SGall) task. Their results were confirmed by Reynaud and Cou-
ture (2012) who used farmers as the subject pool in a field experiment. Bleichrodt
(2002) argues that a potential reason for these differences might be attributed to the
fact that the original method by Eckel and Grossman (2008) does not cover the risk
seeking domain, which can be included with the slight modification we made when
incorporating this method. Dulleck et al. (2015) test the method devised by Andreoni
and Harbaugh (2010) using a graphical representation against the PGp and describe
both a surprisingly high level of within- and inter-method inconsistency. Drichoutis
and Lusk (2012, 2016) compare the PGp method to a modified version of it where
probabilities are held constant. Their analysis reveals that the elicited risk preferences
differ from each other both at the individual and at the aggregate level. Most recently,
Crosetto and Filippin (2016) compare four risk preference elicitation methods with
their original representation and framing and confirm the relatively high instability
across methods.
In parallel, a debate among survey-based and incentivized preference elicitation
methods emerged which were present since the survey on questionnaire-based risk
elicitation methods by Farquhar (1984). Eckel and Grossman (2002) conclude that
non-incentivized survey-based methods provide misleading conclusions for incen-
tivized real-world settings. In line with this finding, Anderson and Mellor (2009)
claim that non-salient survey-based elicitation methods and the PGp method yield
different results. On the contrary, Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015) provide evidence that the
survey-based measure, which Dohmen et al. (2011) had implemented, explains deci-
sions in the trust game better than the SGsure task. Charness and Viceisza (2016)
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provide evidence from developing countries that hypothetical willingness-to-risk
questions and the PGp task deliver deviating results.
1.2.5 Further considerations
A recent stream of literature broadens the horizon of investigation to theoretical
aspects of elicitation methods: Weber et al. (2002) show that people have different
risk attitudes in various fields of life, thus risk preferences seem to be domain-
specific. Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015) document no significant connection between the
HLp task and personality traits. Dohmen et al. (2010) document a connection
between risk preferences and cognitive ability, which was questioned by Anders-
son et al. (2016). Hey et al. (2009) investigate noise and bias under four different
elicitation procedures and emphasize that elicitation methods should be regarded
as strongly context specific measures. Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) provide an
overview and a broader summary of elicitation methods under laboratory conditions,
whereas Charness et al. (2013) survey several risk preference elicitation methods
based on their advantages and disadvantages.
In addition, there is evidence that framing and representation matters. Wilkinson
and Wills (2005) advised against using pie charts showing probabilities and payoffs
as human beings are not good at estimating angles. Hershey et al. (1982) iden-
tify important sources of bias to be taken into account and pitfalls to avoid when
designing elicitation tasks. Most importantly, these include task framing, differences
between the gain and loss domains and the variation of outcome and probability
levels. Von Gaudecker et al. (2008) show that the same risk elicitation methods for
the same subjects deliver different results when using different frameworks — e.g.
multiple price list, trade-off method, ordered lotteries, graphical chart representation,
etc. This procedural indifference was confirmed by Attema and Brouwer (2013) as
well, which implies that risk preferences on an individual level are susceptible to the
representation and framing used.
The previous paragraphs lead us to the conclusion that methods should be com-
pared to each other by using the same representation and format. This justifies our
decision to compare them using the standard MPL framework which guarantees that
the differences cannot be attributed to the different framing and representation of
elicitation tasks. However, this comes at the price that we had to change some of
the methods slightly, which implies that they are not exactly the same as their orig-
inally published versions. We certainly do not claim that the MPL is the only valid
framework, but our choice for it seems justified by its common usage and relative
simplicity. We consider a future investigation using a different representation tech-
nique as a potentially interesting addition. Also, we emphasize that the differences
in our results exist among the MPL representations of the methods and they can only
be generalized to the original methods to a very limited extent. See Table 3 for an
overview of the link between the MPL representation and the particular method that
was published originally, and Table 12 in Appendix A.2, where we compared the
results from our MPL methods to the results in previous studies — most of the stud-
ies deliver significantly different results to the risk parameters measured in our study.
This is not surprising given the considerations in Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5, as we map
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Table 3 Link between MPL representation and literature
Method Corresponding Literature
SGp Bruner (2009)
SGhigh Bruner (2009)
SGlow
SGsure Cohen et al. (1987), Abdellaoui et al. (2011)
SGall Binswanger (1980), Eckel and Grossman (2008)
PGp Holt and Laury (2002), Holt and Laury (2005)
PGhigh Drichoutis and Lusk (2012, 2016)
PGlow Drichoutis and Lusk (2012, 2016)
PGall Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002), Lejuez et al. (2002),
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2010), Crosetto and Filippin (2013)
Questionnaire Weber et al. (2002), Dohmen et al. (2011)
Notes: On the left, this table lists all MPL and questionnaire methods, and on the right the corresponding
literature.
all methods to the MPL space. Furthermore, risk elicitation methods are very noisy
in general. For example the same method with the same representation delivers sig-
nificantly different results in Crosetto and Filippin (2013) and Crosetto and Filippin
(2016).
2 Design
We provide a laboratory experiment to compare different MPL risk elicitation meth-
ods. Subjects answered the risk elicitation questions first. Then, benchmark games
were presented to them to gauge predictive power, which was followed by a non-
incentivized questionnaire. We will provide a detailed description on the exact
procedures of each part in the later paragraphs.
We conducted ten sessions at the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
VCEE) with 96 subjects.12 Sessions lasted about 2 hours, with a range of earnings
between 3e and 50e, amounting to an average payment of 20.78e with a standard
deviation of 10.1e. We calibrated these payments similarly to previous studies (e.g.
Bruner (2009) or Abdellaoui et al. (2011), among others). Average earnings were
about 9.5e in the risk task and about 8.3e in the benchmark games plus a 3.00e
show-up fee. Harrison et al. (2009) provide evidence that the existence of a show-up
fee could lead to an elevated level of risk aversion in the subject pool. In our exper-
iment, this moderate show-up fee was only pointed out to the subjects after making
their decisions in the risk elicitation methods and the benchmark games. Thus, it
could not have distorted their preferences. The experiment was programmed and con-
12One subject has been excluded from our subject pool after repeatedly being unable to answer the control
questions correctly.
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ducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and ORSEE (Greiner 2015) was
used for recruiting subjects.
We employed a within-subject design, meaning that each subject took decisions
in each and every task as in other comparison studies (Eckel and Grossman 2008;
Crosetto and Filippin 2016). This property rules out that the methods differ due to
heterogeneity between subjects, but it comes with the drawback that methods which
were encountered later might deliver more noisy or different results due to fatigue or
other factors, as the answer to a particular method could also be a function of previ-
ously seen MPLs. Consequently, we included the order in which a method appeared
in all regressions as controls wherever possible, compared the variance in earlier and
latter methods and tested for order effects; no significant effects were found.13 To
avoid biases, a random number generator determined the order of methods for each
subject separately in the beginning of each session.14
After receiving instructions on screen and in written form, subjects went through
the nine incentivized risk elicitation methods. In order to avoid potential incentive
effects mentioned by Holt and Laury (2002), the expected earnings for a risk-neutral
individual were equal in every method. Furthermore, to avoid potential biases due to
the different reactions to gains and losses (Hershey et al. 1982), each of our lotteries is
set in the gains domain. Andersen et al. (2006) confirmed previous evidence (Poulton
1989) that there is a slight tendency of anchoring and choosing a switching point
around the middle for risk elicitation tasks. In order to counteract anchoring and one-
directional distortion of preferences as a consequence of this unaviodable pull-to-
center effect, each risk elicitation task appeared randomly either top-down or bottom-
up. Depending on randomization, out of nine potential switching opportunities the
fourth or the sixth option were the risk-neutral switching points.15
Subjects also had the opportunity to look at their given answer and modify it right
after each decision if they wished to do so. After making a decision in each method,
we asked subjects the following question: “On a scale from 1 to 10, how difficult
was it for you to make a decision in the previous setting?” With this question we
assessed self-perceived complexity of the tasks, since there is evidence in the lit-
erature (Mador et al. 2000) that subjects make noisier decisions if the complexity
of a lottery increases, and therefore a less complex method is preferred. Moreover,
Dave et al. (2010) outline the trade-offs between noise, accuracy and subjects’ math-
ematics skills. They suggest that it is a good strategy to make MPL tasks simpler
for subjects. In this spirit, we asked our subjects to indicate the row in which they
switched from the “LEFT” column to the “RIGHT” column, thereby enforcing a
single switching point (SSP). Using this framework, subjects were not required to
make a decision for each and every row in every method, which would have meant
more than 100 monotonous, repetitive binary choices throughout the experiment.
13See Table 11 in Appendix A.1.
14Each subject encountered the methods in a unique random order and each order was used only once in
the entire experiment.
15An example for the difference between the top-down and bottom-up representation can be found in Table
22 in the Online Resource.
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Additionally, this approach ensures that the subjects were guaranteed to give answers
without preference reversals. We consider this option more viable than accepting
multiple switching points — thus allowing inconsistent choices— and using the total
number of “safe” choices to determine a subject’s risk coefficient interval. The SSP
has been used several times, e.g. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) or Jacobson and Petrie
(2009).
By enforcing a SSP, we faced a trade-off between potential boredom and the non-
detection of people with inconsistent preferences. Furthermore, some of the reported
within-method instability might stem from “fat preferences” or indifference between
two or more options. However, the SSP can further be justified in that only a small
proportion of subjects expressed multiple switching points in earlier studies,16 so this
design choice is highly unlikely to drive our results.
In order to test within-method consistency, three of the nine methods were ran-
domly chosen and presented to subjects again, without telling them that they had
already encountered that particular method.17 Repeating all methods was not feasi-
ble due to fatigue concerns, as the experiment is already quite long. This approach
allows us to test both within-method and inter-method consistency. The modification
of subjects’ answers was allowed here once as well. The perceived complexity of
tasks was also elicited again.
Control questions were used for the preference elicitation methods and for each
benchmark game in order to verify that subjects understood the task they were about
to perform.18 Subjects had to answer them correctly in order to participate in the
experiment.
We incorporated the random lottery incentive system emphasized by Cubitt et al.
(1998). Thus, the computer chose one of the twelve risk preference methods and
one of the eight rows within that particular method on a random basis to be
payoff-relevant. Additionally, one of the three benchmark games was chosen to be
payoff-relevant as well. This random lottery incentive system helps keep the costs at
a reasonable level while having similarly sized stakes (than e.g. Bruner 2009) or even
larger stakes (than e.g. Holt and Laury 2002 or Harrison et al. 2007) for the elicita-
tion tasks compared to previous studies, while mitigating potential income effects.
Nevertheless, we note that the random lottery incentive system might be a potential
caveat in our study, since Cox et al. (2015) document somewhat different behavior
under various payment mechanisms.
As far as hedging behavior is concerned, Blanco et al. (2010) provide evidence that
hedging and the corresponding biased beliefs and actions can only be problematic
if the hedging opportunities are highly transparent. Taking this consideration into
account, we provided feedback on the outcome of the risk elicitation tasks only at the
end of the experiment. Thus, it was not possible for subjects to create a portfolio and
use hedging behavior over different parts of the experiment.
16E.g. 8.5% in Dave et al. (2010) and 6.6% in Holt and Laury (2002).
17The exact number of occasions a particular method was encountered a second time is roughly equal
across methods: PGhigh(33), PGlow(25), PGp(26), PGall(39), SGhigh(30), SGsure(33), SGlow(27),
SGp(40), SGall(35).
18See the Online Resource for the exact text of these questions.
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On top of the risk elicitation tasks, we used three benchmark games resembling
real-life situations as well as situations relevant to economists. As behavior in these
settings should only depend on risk attitudes, they will serve as benchmarks to con-
tribute to the debate which risk elicitation methods are appropriate to predict behavior
in these games. The benchmark games appeared in a randomized order. First, we
used the same investment task as Charness and Gneezy (2010). Here, subjects could
decide how much they wanted to invest in stocks and bonds out of an endowment of
10e. Subjects knew that any investment in bonds is a safe investment, and therefore
they received the same amount they had invested in bonds as income. Additionally,
the amount they invested in stocks was to be multiplied by 2.5 or lost completely with
equal chance. Under EUT, this setting implies that both risk neutral and risk seeking
decision makers should invest the entire amount. Thus, in order to be able to differ-
entiate between them, we introduced another investment setting where the potential
payment for stocks was 1.5 times the invested amount.
The third benchmark game was a first-price sealed-bid auction against a comput-
erized opponent in line with Walker et al. (1987). Subjects could bid between 0.00e
and 20.00e of their endowment, and they knew that the computer bid any amount
between 0.00e and 20.00e with equal chance. The potential earnings (E1 for subject
1) according to the bids (x1,x2) are:
E1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
20 − x1 if x1 > x2
0 if x1 < x2
20 − xi or E1 = 0 (with 50% chance) if x1 = x2
Our benchmark games are deliberately chosen in such a way that risk is clearly rel-
evant in the games, while being one step away from the artificial risk elicitation
mechanisms. Therefore, all benchmark games are framed heavily, while still ensuring
that risk attitudes should be the only factor driving a subject’s decisions. The invest-
ment settings are very similar to the risk elicitation mechanisms described above in
the sense that they resemble an SG method (with the difference that you choose your
sure payoff and your lottery at the same time). The auction is more complex, as the
optimal risk-neutral solution is harder to compute, but here you basically choose your
own lottery, too. We therefore expect stronger correlation with the MPL methods for
the investment games.
The experiment concluded with an extensive questionnaire. In order to incorpo-
rate survey-based measures, we asked subjects to provide an answer on a ten-point
Likert-scale to the following two questions in line with Dohmen et al. (2011): “In
general, are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks?” and “In financial situations, are you a person who is fully prepared
to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” The perceived complexity of
these questions was elicited as well. In the questionnaire, we elicited the following
socioeconomic factors: Age, gender, field of study, years of university education,
nationality, high school grades in mathematics, monthly income and monthly expen-
diture. Furthermore, we elicited cognitive ability by conducting a cognitive reflec-
tion test (Frederick 2005). Lastly, we assessed subjects’ personalities in line with
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Rammstedt and John (2007), who provide a short measure of personality traits
according to the BIG519 methodology introduced by Costa and McCrae (1992).
3 Results
We will first establish in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 that the elicited risk parameter is highly
dependent on the particular variant of MPL used because the overall distributions
of switching points are very diverse and the rank correlations between the different
methods are low in most circumstances. Section 3.3 analyzes the common features
across methods. In Section 3.4 we apply multiple measures to determine method
quality. To this end, we first use benchmark games to let the data speak which risk
elicitation methods predict behavior in these games best. In Section 3.4.2, we will
show which method produces the most stable results overall. Section 3.5 concludes
with the result that the PGhigh method is the most stable method and that it has the
highest predictive power.
3.1 Overall distributions are different
According to EUT, a subject’s behavior does not depend on which parameters are
changed from row to row, as his underlying risk parameter value is constant. As the
different versions of the MPL are calculated in such a way that the same switching
point implies the same risk parameter interval, a consistent individual should have the
same switching point in all versions of the MPL. This implies that the distributions
of switching points should be the same across methods, barring some noise.
First, see Fig. 1 for a graphical representation of the distributions. It is clearly
visible at first glance that the distributions are not the same across all methods. For
example, in the SGp method, most subjects would be classified as highly risk loving,
whereas in the PGhigh method the majority of subjects would be classified as risk
averse.
To verify whether distributions across methods are the same, we conduct two tests:
a Friedman test, which shows that the means are not the same across methods (p <
0.0001), and a Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows that the distribution of answers is
not the same across methods (p < 0.0001). We conclude that the switching points
are, contrary to standard theory but in accordance with the literature, dependent upon
the version of the particular MPL variation used.
To see which specific versions are significantly different from each other, we con-
duct a series of Wilcoxon tests, the natural pairwise analogue to the Kruskal-Wallis
test. We use the Wilcoxon test to give a comparison of the distributions, as a dif-
ference in distributions is a more meaningful statistic here than a comparison of
means. The p-values of the pairwise tests can be found in Table 4. Out of 55 pairwise
19In the BIG5, personality is measured along five dimensions: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Neuroticism and Openness.
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Fig. 1 Distributions of risk preferences; a low value indicates risk loving and a high value indicates
risk averse behavior; x-axis: switching points (e.g. risk preferences) of subjects, where 1 means a subject
switches from left to right in the first row and 9 means a subject never switches; y-axis: frequency of
switching point
comparisons, 28 comparisons indicate that methods are different at p < 0.001.
Thirty-four (43) instances suggest that methods are different at p < 0.01 (0.05) sig-
nificance levels.20 To make sure that the differing results are not a product of fatigue
or order effects, we also test whether CRRA-coefficients of methods that are encoun-
tered later in the experiment exhibit biases or more noise; the resulting tests show no
significant order effects overall and across methods.21
We conclude that different methods deliver significantly different results, and that
the different versions of the MPL cannot be used interchangeably, as the estimated
risk preference parameter depends heavily on the version used. Subjects can easily
be classified as risk loving in one version and as risk averse in another. Of course
we do not know a subject’s true risk preferences, and therefore any of the methods
might be able to classify a subject correctly. To provide an answer to this puzzle, see
Section 3.4.2, where we conduct a quality assessment of the different methods.
20Note that one should be careful while reading this table and the ones following because of the presence
of the multiple testing problem; therefore, we introduce a new notation in the tables: P-values lower than
0.001 are denoted by three stars, p-values lower than 0.01 are denoted by two stars and p-values lower than
0.05 are denoted by one star. p < 0.001 can be interpreted as significant, even when using the conservative
Bonferroni correction (see Abdi 2007).
21See Table 11 in Appendix A.2.
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Table 4 Pairwise Wilcoxon test for equality of distribution
SGp SGhigh SGlow SGsure SGall PGp PGhigh PGlow PGall GQ
SGhigh .00***
SGlow .00*** .00***
SGsure .00*** .37 .00***
SGall .79 .00*** .00*** .01**
PGp .00*** .01** .28 .00*** .00***
PGhigh .00*** .00*** .02* .00*** .00*** .00***
PGlow .00*** .02* .23 .01** .00*** .68 .00***
PGall .00*** .31 .02* .04* .00*** .08 .00*** .39
GQ .02* .03* .00*** .29 .04* .00*** .00*** .00*** .01**
FQ .00*** .64 .01** .29 .00*** .02* .00*** .04* .36 .00***
Notes: p-values of pairwise Wilcoxon tests are displayed; GQ: general question; FQ: financial question;
stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
3.2 Rank correlations are low
In this section we look at the rank correlation coefficients between the different meth-
ods and the questionnaire answers. If there are high rank correlations between the
risk elicitation methods, one might argue that it is irrelevant which one is used if one
intends to control for risk attitudes under any given circumstance. Rank correlations
between the MPL methods and the questionnaire measures can be found in Table 5.
We see that some of the correlations are significant, but only 11% of all pairwise
comparisons in total if we test conservatively at p < 0.001 because of the multi-
ple testing problem. Pay special attention to the fact that PGp, the most widely used
method today, has no significant rank correlations with any of the other methods.22
See also Table 10 in Appendix A.1 for standard correlations, which basically gives
the same results as Table 5.
These findings provide further evidence that the elicitation procedure should be
chosen with care as the elicited risk aversion coefficient and also the relative ranking
of subjects according to each method varies within broad boundaries.
3.3 Method similarities
We have established in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 that there are significant differences in
the distributions of the risk elicitation methods. There are, however, some similarities
that can be observed across methods: In Table 6, we classify MPLs according to
whether the high payoff, the low payoff, the probabilities or the certainty equivalents
change in the MPL table, whether the method has a certainty equivalent and whether
the table was presented in a top-down or bottom-up format. Furthermore, we control
22Also, the financial questionnaire (FQ) results have much higher correlations with the other methods than
the general questionnaire (GQ) results, strengthening the argument that risk attitudes are domain specific.
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Table 5 Spearman rank correlation coefficients
SGp SGhigh SGlow SGsure SGall PGp PGhigh PGlow PGall GQ
SGhigh .46
SGlow .33*** .44***
SGsure .05 .22* .26*
SGall .03 .18 -.03 .19
PGp .17 .15 .17 .21* -.04
PGhigh .20 .39*** .21* .03** .21* .25*
PGlow .31** .28** .25* .19 -.02 .13 .21*
PGall .24 .21* -.01 .08 .19 .04 -.01 .08
GQ .15 .13* .06 -.12 .11 .02 .14 .04 .06
FQ .26* .23* .29* .18 .10 -.04 .04 .24* .13 .46***
Notes: Table includes the nine different methods and the questionnaires (GQ: general questionnaire, FQ:
financial questionnaire); stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
for age, gender, cognitive reflection scores and the order in which the tables were
presented. Column 1 shows the results for the first time a method was encountered,
and column 2 for the repeated measurements.
We see that generally, methods that change the probabilities or methods that have a
certainty equivalent classify subjects as more risk loving, while methods that change
the low payoffs classify subjects as more risk-averse.23 When a method is presented
to subjects for the first time, changing the high payoff also classifies them as more
risk-loving, while presenting the table with ascending numbers seems to classify sub-
jects as more risk-averse, although these two effects seem to vanish when presenting
subjects with the same tables again. Note that we do not observe order effects, or
significant effects of the control variables.
3.4 Method quality indicators
We use two avenues to measure a method’s quality: its predictive power
(Section 3.4.1) and its stability (Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Predictive power
In order to see which method predicts behavior best in our benchmark games, we
look at three statistics: the predictive power by simple OLS regression, the predictive
power by Spearman rank correlation, and the absolute average deviation from the
prediction.
In Table 7, we see the outcome of OLS regressions in the upper part, while con-
trolling for personality measures and socioeconomic variables. In the lower part of
23In two MPL methods, PGall and SGall, multiple characteristics of the MPL table were changed at the
same time. Consequently, in these methods the effects add up.
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Table 6 Similarities across all methods
Not Repeated Repeated
High Payoff changes −.108∗∗ .052
Low Payoff changes .208∗∗∗ .206∗∗∗
Probability changes −.306∗∗∗ −.335∗∗∗
Certainty Equivalent changes .086∗ −.039
Has Certainty Equivalent −.496∗∗∗ −.504∗∗∗
Top-Down Representation .085∗∗ .035
Constant .835 .205
R2 .121 .190
Number of Observations 864 288
Notes: OLS regressions clustered by individual subjects with one observation being the outcome from one
answer of one subject in one method;
dependent variable is the resulting CRRA-coefficient, with low scores indicating risk-loving behavior;
independent variables on the left are dummies;
nonsignificant controls for age, gender, order, BIG5 scores, income and CRT scores are included in the
regressions but omitted in the table;
first column gives results for the first time subjects encountered one of the nine methods, second column
for the repeated measurements;
stars are given as follows (differently than in the other tables, due to the absence of a multiple testing
problem): *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01
Table 7 you see Spearman rank correlation coefficients, which we include because
besides the absolute size of the elicited coefficients, the correct rank ordering of sub-
jects is essential since these methods are often used to control for the role of risk
attitude in various settings. The OLS regression can be understood as follows: The
dependent variable is the outcome of a particular benchmark game, and the indepen-
dent variables include the outcome in terms of the elicited risk aversion parameter
ρ of one of the risk elicitation methods24 plus all controls mentioned above.25 The
resulting coefficients in the investment games are negative because a higher ρ implies
risk-averse behavior, and therefore lower investments and bids in the benchmark
games; the reverse is true for the auction. The corresponding adjusted R2 values can
be found in parentheses below the coefficients.
The OLS regression equation is then given by
BGi,j = β0 + β1 ∗ MPLj +
6∑
k=2
βk ∗ BIG5k +
11∑
l=7
βl ∗ SEl + β12 ∗ CRT + i ,
where i denotes the index of benchmark games (BG), j denotes the index of risk
measures, MPL denotes the outcome of a risk elicitation method, BIG5 denotes
24The results do not change qualitatively if we use the switching points as independent variables instead
of ρ. This data is available upon request.
25It is not possible to add controls in the Spearman rank correlation.
J Risk Uncertain
Table 7 Explanatory power
SGp SGhigh SGlow SGsure SGall PGp PGhigh PGlow PGall GQ FQ
OLS coefficients
Auction .68 .52 .57 −.03 −.3 .03 0 .58 −.52 .13 −.08
(.05) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Inv. Low −.09 −.94* −.48 .01 −.67 −.39 −1.48*** −.23 −.44 .3* .09
(.00) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.08) (.00) (.00) (.02) (.00)
Inv. High −.9** −.68 −.28 .22 .58 −.46 −.66 −.65 .2 .28** .25**
(.16) (.12) (.09) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.11) (.12) (.08) (.13) (.13)
Spearman rank correlation coefficients
Auct. .23* .09 .14 .17 .07 .11 .06 .16 −.13 .10 .11
Inv. Low .02 .19 .17 .06 .06 .11 .36*** .12 .04 .19 .11
Inv. High .28** .28** .05 .00 .03 .13 .26** .23* .09 .31** .28**
Notes: In the OLS regression, the dependent variable is the outcome in one of the four benchmark games,
the independent variables are the outcome in terms of ρ from one method plus controls (age, gender, BIG5,
CRT test, income, years of university education); the adjusted R2 value for the regression can be found
below a coefficient; Stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
personality measures according to the BIG5, SE denotes the socioeconomic variables
and CRT denotes the number of correct answers in the cognitive reflection test.
Additionally, we can calculate a point prediction in each of the benchmark games
for each risk elicitation method (but not for the questionnaires). In Table 8 we
report the absolute average deviations from these predictions, averaged over all three
benchmark games according to the formula
AAD =
(
n∑
i=1
|Hi − H ∗i | +
n∑
i=1
|Li − L∗i | +
n∑
i=1
|Ai − A∗i |
2
)
/(3n),
where Hi denotes high investment game outcomes and H ∗i high investment game
predictions (L stands for investment low and A for auction).26
In the auction, none of the methods produce statistically significant results in
the OLS regression. This is puzzling, as the auction can in itself be seen as a risk
elicitation procedure, albeit with heavy framing. Recent literature, however, pro-
vides evidence that not only risk attitudes but also other factors like regret aversion
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008) could drive behavior in auctions. As far as
the Spearman rank correlation is concerned, the SGp method is the only one that is
rank correlated (p < 0.05) with auction behavior.
In the investment games, the methods produce much better results. In the low
investment setting, PGhigh has the biggest explanatory power, with SGhigh being a
close follower. Note that it is surprising that PGhigh is the best predictor both in the
26Note that we divide the deviation in the auction game by 2 because the choice range in the auction game
is twice as high.
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Table 8 Deviations from predictions
SGp SGhigh SGlow SGsure SGall PGp PGhigh PGlow PGall
Deviation 1.91 2.41 2.19 2.03 2.11 2.27 1.75 2.17 2.11
Notes: Absolute average deviations from the predictions in the benchmark games
regression and the rank correlation, as the investment games in themselves can be
interpreted as standard gamble methods, so one would expect one of these methods
to perform best.
In the high investment setting, many methods (PGhigh, PGlow, SGhigh, SGlow,
SGp, and the questionnaires) are able to explain a part of the variance, with SGp
being the one giving the best results (p < 0.01). Note that in this setting, survey-
based measures perform very well, so questionnaire measures seem to serve as good
proxies for subjects’ risk preferences in some circumstances. Note that the adjusted
R2 values are relatively low in general; we added the above mentioned controls to
our regressions, which are not able to pick up much of the variation.27
As far as the deviations from the predictions are concerned, PGhigh performs best
with an average deviation of 1.75 across all benchmark games with SGp and SGlow
also having low deviations.28
In conclusion, PGhigh and SGp yield the best results in explaining behavior, with
PGhigh having the lowest deviation from the prediction of behavior in the benchmark
games. We conclude that PGhigh has the highest predictive power with SGp being
a close runner-up. Additionally, we relax our assumptions on CRRA and perform
robustness checks taking CARA, DRRA, DARA, IRRA and IARA into account in
Tables 23–34 in the Online Resource.29 Furthermore, due to the ample evidence on
the violations of EUT, we provide the same regressions by taking probability weight-
ing,30 prospect theory31 and cumulative prospect theory into consideration.32 The
27In all regressions, none of the controls were significant at p < 0.05. This implies that behavior seems to
primarily be driven by risk attitudes.
28Note that one might be concerned with this analysis because if a method generally classifies subjects
as risk-averse, it is not surprising that it explains behavior well in the low investment setting, as subjects
naturally behave risk-aversely in this setting due to the parameters. However, this critique is not valid for
any method that provides good predictions across multiple benchmark games (e.g. PGhigh).
29We used subjects’ self-reported monthly income and expenditure as a proxy for their wealth. This was
necessary, since our subject pool consisted of students who are not expected to have any wealth, but their
monthly income or expenditure can serve as a good proxy for this purpose as they are expected to be
highly correlated with their wealth (Persson and Tabellini 1994) and social class.
30In the Online Resource, we report the regressions using the probability weighting function w(p) =
pγ
[pγ +(1−p)γ ] 1γ
.
31As our lotteries are in the gains domain, prospect theory amounts to u(c) = cα .
32For prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory as well as probability weighting functions, we used
the functional form and parameters provided in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Quiggin (1982) to
create the tables in the Online Resource, different specifications for PT provided in Camerer and Ho
(1994) and in Wu and Gonzalez (1996), as well as for PW in Prelec (1998), do not change the results
qualitatively. Specifications and parameters for DRRA and IRRA can be found in Andersen et al. (2012)
and Saha (1993), respectively, for IARA and DARA in Saha (1993).
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results show that our findings remain quantitatively and qualitatively the same under
different specifications. In general, we see similar explanatory power and in the vast
majority of cases the same significance levels for the PGhigh and SGp methods,
which confirm our findings. In some specifications, we even see that the coefficient
for PGhigh becomes significant also for the investment games with low stakes, for
example under DRRA. Nevertheless, a further justification is that some of the other
methods (SGhigh, PGlow and questionnaire methods) lose significance (for example
under PT, IRRA or IARA) under some of the above mentioned alternative theoretical
foundations and functional forms.
3.4.2 Stability measures
In this section, we evaluate the stability of the different MPL representations.
Remember that after our subjects had gone through all nine MPL methods, three of
them were randomly chosen and presented to them again. A method can be described
as stable if the given answers between the first and the second time a method was
encountered are very similar. To analyze this similarity, we use three criteria: equal-
ity of overall distribution, equality of rank ordering and absolute average deviation
between the first and second answers. For reasons of completeness, we also report
the perceived complexity of each method.33
Table 9 reports these measures. In the first column we give p-values from a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that evaluates whether the distributions of the first and the
second time a method is encountered are the same. A significant p-value means that
the distributions are significantly different from each other, indicating a low stability
of overall distribution across a 30 minute time period.
The second column gives the rank correlation between the first and second time
a method was encountered. This measure is important because if a method’s over-
all distribution merely shifted up or down without changing the rank ordering of
subjects, this method can also be described as stable since the ordering of subjects
remains the same.
The third column reports the absolute average deviation (AAD) of subjects’
answers when a particular method is presented to them again, compared to the first
time — a lower value is therefore better. The last column gives the means of the
perceived complexity of a method on a 1 to 10 Likert scale.
To visualize these results, we also report the distributions of the differences in
switching points between the first and the second time a method is encountered in
Fig. 2.
Any method that does not yield stable results over a 30 minute time period cannot
be described as stable, and stability is a highly preferable characteristic in a risk
measure. For the KS-test (column 1 in Table 9), stability relative to the other methods
is indicated by a nonsignificant result: For any methods with a significant result, the
33We do not use complexity as a stability measure, as the impact of a higher perceived complexity is not
clear. On the one hand, one might argue that a higher measure in these categories implies noisier behavior,
but on the other hand one might argue that a subject takes more time thinking about the problem at hand.
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Table 9 Stability Measures
Method KS-Test Rank Corr. AAD Complexity
SGp .453 .51*** 1.60 3.42
SGsure .003 .51*** 1.37 3.92
SGhigh .644 .39** 1.48 3.97
SGlow .007 .35 1.96 3.20
SGall .005 .16 1.8 4.81
PGp .240 .23 1.33 4.21
PGhigh .879 .45*** 1.24 3.78
PGlow .006 .25 2.04 4.29
PGall .000 .19 1.85 5.75
Notes: First column: P-values for a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions; Second column:
Rank correlation between the distributions of first and second answers (stars indicate significant rank
correlation); Third column: Absolute average deviation (AAD) between the first and the second decision
in the same method; Fourth column: Indicates a subject’s perceived complexity of a method; Stars are
given as follows: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01
overall distributions of answers are different between the first and the second time a
method was encountered. Four of the methods have a nonsignificant p-value: SGp,
SGhigh, PGp, PGhigh.
A significant rank correlation (column 2 in Table 9) also indicates a stable risk
measure, indicating a shift in the distribution, but no change in rank ordering. We see
that three of those four methods have significant rank correlations with p < 0.01:
SGp, SGsure and PGhigh.
A low absolute average deviation in answers is also an indicator of a stable risk
measure, and the method with the lowest deviation is PGhigh, followed by PGp and
SGsure.
Concerning the complexity, we see that a method that is perceived as less com-
plex does not necessarily imply more stability in answers, as SGlow has the lowest
complexity rating, yet it is classified as unstable in all three categories. However, a
general tendency of low complexity indicating more stability can be observed.
As far as a possible relationship between stability and the control variables (CRT
and BIG5 scores, age, gender, income, years of university education) is concerned,
no significant effects have been found, so the results will be omitted here.34 Finally,
we mention that the slight differences in the number of observations between the
repetitions of particular methods — caused by the pseudo-random number generator
— do not drive within-method consistency.
We conclude that PGhigh is the most stable method, as it is the only method that
performs well in all three categories, with the overall distributions of switching points
34On the subject level, we tested whether the average deviation between the first and repeated decisions are
related to any of the control variables, whether the standard deviation of CRRA scores across all methods
is related to the control variables, and whether the average differences between the predicted and the actual
outcomes in the benchmark games are related, both per method and overall. At most weakly significant
results were found; the results are available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 2 Distributions of absolute differences in switching points between the first and the second time a
method is encountered
not being significantly different, high rank correlations and low average deviation.
SGp, SGsure and PGp perform well in two of the three categories.
3.5 Results conclusion
In the benchmark games, as far as predictive power is concerned, we conclude that
PGhigh has the highest predictive power with SGp being a close second, irrespec-
tive of the assumed functional form or theoretical framework.35 We conclude that
only the PGhigh (Drichoutis and Lusk, 2012 & 2016), PGp (Holt and Laury 2002),
SGsure (Cohen et al. 1987; Abdellaoui et al. 2011) and SGp (Bruner 2009) methods
lead to consistent results within a 30-minute time frame, with the PGhigh method
being by far the most consistent: The PGhigh method’s performance is superior to
the other methods in terms of deviations from normative predictions, overall and rel-
ative stability across time, etc. Our findings are further supported by the fact that
we controlled for personality traits, order effects, various socioeconomic factors and
cognitive reflection in our analyses.
Therefore, we conclude that while SGp also has high predictive power and good
stability in answers, the most stable MPL method with the highest predictive power
is PGhigh, which corresponds to a method derived by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012,
2016) in our alternative interpretation.
35For non-incentivized surveys, our data shows that eliciting preferences with general and financial
questions is a relatively good predictor compared to several incentivized elicitation methods.
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4 Conclusion
We conducted a holistic assessment and analysis of MPL risk elicitation meth-
ods that are present in the economics literature with a sophisticated experimental
design using a unified framework and representation method. Previous findings
in the literature (Dave et al. 2010; Crosetto and Filippin 2016; etc.) indicate that
between-method consistency of particular methods is low. We confirm this find-
ing by extending our analysis to all popular methods using the same representation.
Furthermore, we show that distributional differences among methods are far from
negligible. In addition, we investigate the time consistency of all these methods and
document substantial differences in a 30-minute time period for most of the meth-
ods. All this implies that an arbitrary selection of a particular risk assessment method
can lead to differing results and misleading revealed preferences. Thus, it matters
which elicitation method is used by researchers in order to control for risk and other
preferences.
Our main takeaway is that we provide a suggestion for which elicitation method to
use based on objective criteria that assess within-method as well as between-method
consistency and validity in real-world settings such as investments and auctions, and
our suggestion is to use the PGhigh method by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012). This par-
ticular method performs best if we look at the absolute deviations from the normative
predictions in benchmark games and also in terms of rank correlations. Furthermore,
it yields highly correlated results within a 30-minute time frame in terms of indi-
vidual deviations and overall distribution. These findings remain robust — in some
cases even more pronounced — if we relax our assumptions on CRRA to alternative
functions such as CARA, DRRA, DARA, IRRA and IARA. Moreover, our conclu-
sions remain the same if we allow subjective probability weighting or if we estimate
risk attitude parameters in line with prospect theory or cumulative prospect theory.
In a broader context, one should take care when choosing which risk elicitation
method to use, especially if one aims to control for risk attitudes in potential real-
world contexts such as investment into assets. To be taken into consideration are the
nature of the task they intend to control for, trade-off effects between noise, exactness
and simplicity. Moreover, we find that changing both the potential rewards and prob-
abilities is perceived as relatively complex by subjects and yields inconsistent results.
A further point to consider is that varying the potentially achievable minimum payoff
seems to induce more risk-averse behavior while the presence of a certainty equiva-
lent fosters risk taking. Cognitive ability, personality traits and other socioeconomic
factors do not seem to be related to risk aversion nor to the extent of consistency we
measured.
The debate between changing the probabilities or rewards (Bruner 2009) seems
to be far from settled as one of the methods in each context (PGhigh and SGp)
delivers promising results. In addition, our findings might provide guidance in imple-
menting other elicitation methods in the MPL format — e.g. loss aversion (Ga¨chter
et al. 2010), willingness to pay (Kahneman et al. 1990), individual discount rates
(Harrison et al. 2002) — in terms of whether to vary probabilities, rewards or to use
a certainty equivalent. On a final note we suggest that the relatively high variation
J Risk Uncertain
in risk preferences across and within particular methods might not be mere artifacts
— especially in light of other recent evidence (Andreoni et al. 2015). We encour-
age further research to shed light on the consistency of other preference elicitation
mechanisms such as social preferences or overconfidence.
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Appendix
A.1 Robustness checks
Table 10 shows standard correlation coefficients between methods; the results are
qualitatively the same as in Table 5.
Table 11 tests for linear order effects in the data: As the nine methods were pre-
sented to subjects in a randomized order, risk aversion or noise might increase or
Table 10 Correlation coefficients between the methods
SGp SGhigh SGlow SGsure SGall PGp PGhigh PGlow PGall GQ
SGhigh .46***
SGlow .37*** .46***
SGsure .01 .18 .25*
SGall .02 .12 0 .16
PGp .13 .12 .15 .23** −.08
PGhigh .07 .27** .10 .26* .12 .26*
PGlow .27** .21* .20 .17 −.04 .12 .10
PGall .17 .16 −.06 .04 .17 −.01 −.08 .03
GQ .12 .16 0 −.14 .09 −.07 .12 .02 .01
FQ .25** .17 .27** .19 .07 −.05 −.02 .20 .03 .46**
Notes: This table shows standard correlations as opposed to Spearman rank correlations as in Table 5. SG
stands for “standard gamble” and PG for “paired gamble”. Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same.
Stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
J Risk Uncertain
Table 11 Testing for order
effects – No significant effects Dependent Variable
Method CRRA Standard Deviation CRRA
PGhigh −0.001 0.006
PGlow −0.013 0.019
PGp −0.021 0.028
PGall −0.013 0.013
SGhigh −0.007 −0.014
SGlow −0.023 0.029
SGsure 0.031 −0.037
SGp 0.021 −0.020
SGall −0.011 −0.004
Overall −0.004 0.000
Notes: Reported coefficients for
OLS regressions; the dependent
variable is the standard
deviation (column 1) of the
CRRA-coefficient or the CRRA
score (column 2) across all
subjects in one particular order,
the independent variable is the
order in which a method
appeared, i.e. the number of
previously encountered MPLs;
stars are given as follows: *:
p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01
Table 12 Comparison of results to previous studies
Our study Previous Studies t-test
Method Mean SD Mean SD Subjects Study p-value
PGhigh 0.87 0.56 0.35 0.18 100 Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) .001
PGlow 0.57 0.67 0.35 0.18 100 Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) .002
PGp 0.62 0.54 0.32 0.41 175 Holt and Laury (2002) .001
0.23 0.14 39 Abdellaoui et al. (2011) .001
0.59 0.07 100 Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) .145
0.39 0.54 78 Dulleck et al. (2015) .006
0.43 0.6 444 Crosetto and Filippin (2016) .004
0.62 0.8 268 Andersen et al. (2008b) 1
0.67 0.57 881 Dave et al. (2010) .455
PGall 0.47 0.62 0.82 − 86 Lejuez et al. (2002) −
1.13 0.64 444 Crosetto and Filippin (2016) .001
0.7 0.83 444 Crosetto and Filippin (2013) .011
SGhigh 0.4 0.65 0.51 0.59 157 Bruner (2009) .168
SGlow 0.69 0.68
SGsure 0.31 0.66 0.2 0.08 39 Abdellaoui et al. (2011) .302
SGp 0.02 0.72 0.45 0.45 157 Bruner (2009) .001
SGall 0.07 0.63 0.6 0.59 256 Eckel and Grossman (2008) .001
0.73 0.9 30 Reynaud and Couture (2012) .001
0.694 0.33 444 Crosetto and Filippin (2016) .001
Notes: mean and standard deviation in terms of CRRA-coefficients;N = 96 in our study; PGp by Crosetto
and Filippin (2016) follows the method in Lejuez et al. (2002); in Lejuez et al. (2002) no standard deviation
was reported
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decrease as a function of previously seenMPLs. Coefficients in Table 11 can be inter-
preted as a change in standard deviation (i.e. noise) of CRRA coefficients or changes
in CRRA coefficients themselves as a function of order, i.e. the number of previously
encountered MPLs. No significant effects were found.
For robustness checks on functional form (PT, CARA, DRRA, IRRA, IARA,
DARA and probability weighting), please refer to the Online Resource, Tables 23–34.
A.2 Comparison of our results to the results in previous studies
In Table 12 we see the differences in the mean values of CRRA risk coefficients
between previous studies and our results for each method, where we find that sev-
eral studies deliver significantly different results to ours. This is not surprising for
two reasons: First, risk elicitation methods are very noisy in general. For example
the same method with the same representation delivers significantly different results
in Crosetto and Filippin (2013) and Crosetto and Filippin (2016), or the task by Holt
and Laury (2002), which delivered highly heterogeneous results in past studies as
Table 12 shows. Second, framing and representation are vastly different in most stud-
ies when compared to our study. Furthermore, in the studies by Eckel and Grossman
(2008), Reynaud and Couture (2012) and Crosetto and Filippin (2016) the risk lov-
ing domain is not covered in the SGall task; that and the pull-to-center effect drives
the risk estimates to be higher, which is also suggested by Bleichrodt (2002) and
Andersen et al. (2006).
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